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A permanent revolution? 
Zealots & common sense 
BRIAN EASTON 
I T IS OVER 12 YEARS since the beginning of the revolu-tion of the "commercialisation of New Zealand". Twelve 
years after the fall of the Bastille the French revolution 
was over, and Napoleon ruled . Twelve years after the 
October Revolution of 1917, the Russian revolution was 
over and Stalin had 
expelled Trotsky and 
Buhkarin. Neither 
country returned to a 
period of some sort 
of normality, but nor 
was there the view 
that the revolution 
was incomplete, and 
needed to be pro-
gressed. 
Yet 12 years af-
ter Rogernomics, key 
revolutionaries con-
tinue to call for 
further reforms. The 
terms of reference 
given to Alan Schick 
by the State Services 
Commission and Treasury talk about further "improve-
ments" and "future progress". 1 Recently the Chairman of 
the Business Round table demanded further economic re-
structuring. We may wonder why after 12 years the 
reformers have still not got it right. Pessimists might won-
der whether the revolutionaries are punch-drunk Maoists, 
committed to a permanent revolution for its own sake, 
planning a cultural revolution sometime in the future. 
The events of the last 12 years were first described as 
"the quiet revolution" in a book of that name written by 
Colin James in 19862 More recently, there has been a 
television program called "Revolution" .3 Neither defines 
what they mean by "revolution", a task which has chal-
lenged political theorists and historians . To understand 
the New Zealand experience, we might well go to Ralf 
Dahrendorf who identified: 
two quite different versions of dramatic change. One is 
deep change, the transformation of core structures of a 
society which in the nature of the case takes time; the 
other is quick change, notably the circulation of those at 
the top within days or months by highly visible, often 
violent action. The first might be called social revolution, 
the second political revolution. The Industrial Revolution 
was in this sense social, the French Revolution was politi-
cal' 
While the events of the last 12 years in New Zealand 
are presented as a political revolution - a change of the 
elite and the way it manages the country - the political 
change reflected long term social change more akin to the 
industrial revolution. 
Moreover while some 
features of that social 
change were univer-
sal among all rich 
countries, there were 
distinctive features in 
the New Zealand ex-
perience, which 
exacerbated the in-
tensity of the political 
change. 
The early post-
war period had been 
one of considerable 
stability. The 
economy was a 
"monoculture", with 
an external sector de-
pendent upon a single product - grass which had been 
processed into wool. meat, butter and cheese- sold largely 
to the single market of the United Kingdom.5 That exter-
nal economic structure had been in place since the end of 
the nineteenth century, and the politics, society, and in-
ternal economic structure had evolved in response to it. 
In particular from the late 1930s, a system of interven-
tions and protections transferred the foreign exchange 
earned by the pastoral sector, to the thriving domestic 
economy which needed them to pay for imports. Because 
the export sector was sufficiently narrow, the interven-
tions could be managed without damaging its 
performance. 
This idyll came to an end in the mid 1960s, when the 
price of wool - the most important export - collapsed, a 
disaster reinforced by downward pressures on meat and 
dairy export prices (relative to import prices) . The pasto-
ral sector - the farmers and the processors - were in 
difficulty, but so was the whole economy. No longer could 
foreign exchange be earned with the ease it had in the 
first two decades of the postwar era, so it became increas-
ingly difficult to support the protected industries which 
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had depended upon the success of the pastoral exporter 
for their foreign exchange. 
Fortunately the New Zealand economy responded 
by diversifying into a much less concentrated export struc-
ture. Wool, which was the king of the foreign exchange 
earners, has been replaced by tourism. Today wool is also 
behind fishing, forestry, general manufacturing and hor-
ticultural exporting (as well as meat and dairy). Britain, 
which as recently as 1965 took two thirds of all exports, is 
today behind Australia, Japan, the United State, Greater 
China, and Korea as a trading partner. 
The export diversification of the 1970s was a magnifi-
cent achievement, but the generation of new sources of 
foreign exchange undermined the arrangements for the 
domestic economy, politics, and society. The interven-
tions could no longer function properly, because exporting 
was now so pert.·asive, and involved so many different 
sectors it was no longer possible to target interventions 
without damaging exporters. 
This diversification was greater than, and more rapid 
than, any other OECD country.• The New Zealand politi-
cal revolution was in part a response to these economic 
changes. As a result the New Zealand changes were dis-
tinctive (and more extreme) when compared to transitions 
going on in other rich countries. But they were changing 
too. Economically the world ·has been going through a 
process of globalisation involving an integration of its 
industrial production (and to a lesser extent the service 
industries), and of its financial markets . 
There was also a social revolution in the aspirations 
and consumption patterns of individuals including the 
increasing role of women and overall a grea!er affluence 
which enabled greater social diversity. These were not 
peculiar to New Zealand, but reinforced the need for 
major structural change. (Unique to postwar New Zea-
land was the urbanisation of the Maori.) 
The international trends of increased social heteroge-
neity, plus the external diversification that the New 
Zealand economy experienced in an increasing globalised 
world, diminished the ability to manage New Zealand in 
the detailed interventionist way which had evolved be-
tween the late 1930s and late 1960s. Throughout the 1970s 
and the early 1980s there were attempts to change that 
regime to one which made more use of the market mecha-
nism, together with some liberalisation of the laws which 
governed social relationships. But the changes were re-
luctant and incremental, and certainly not great enough 
to accommodate all the pressures. 
It is usual to blame the failure to respond effectively 
on the dominant politician of the period, Robert Muldoon, 
but that overplays the importance of the individual, and 
underplays the institutional rigidity that was inherent in 
the detailed interventionist political process which had 
developed. One of the central issues facing any organism 
is how to evolve and adapt to new situations and circum-
stances. A fundamental difference between capitalism and 
communism in the twentieth century is that the commu-
nist regimes were less able to adapt, and so less able 
survive. The New Zealand was also at the inflexible end 
of the spectrum. 
Thus Labour was elected in 1984 to govern a country 
which had been under an economic and social revolution 
for almost two decades, but where political and policy 
adaptation had not kept pace. But while the New Zealand 
political institutions were inflexible and discouraged 
change, they depended on an acceptance of a series of 
conventions - on a consensus - rather than any deeply 
embedded structure. This is evident in a comparison be-
tween the experience of the Australian Labour and l'he 
New Zealand Labour governments of the 1980s. Both had 
a predilection for commercialisation, but in the case of 
Australia, a variety of formal constitutional arrangements 
and informal institutions moderate the pressures for ex-
tremism.' It is not accidental that Australian Labor was 
more successful, both politically and in terms of economic 
performance. 
There is an irony here. Muldoon could not get the 
change he desired - the country desired - because he 
played the game according to the conventions. His suc-
cessors cut that gordian knot, and unleashed the political 
revolution. But the Labour government had no deep analy-
sis of the need for a transformation in the political and 
economic mechanisms consequent upon the social revo-
lution. Not only were their economic policies often at 
odds with the electoral promises, but Labour found it 
difficult to explain or justify them, other than in bumper 
sticker slogans of a crude ideology very different from the 
party's traditional values. 
The policies were developed by the Treasury, which 
recognised some of the profound social revolution which 
had been occurring, but not always with the understand-
ing we have from hindsight, or even in terms of the best 
understanding at the time. Undoubtedly there had to be 
market and social liberalisation. But the measures taken 
were much more extreme than was necessary or justified. 
The pressure on the government from their advisers was 
to take the most ideologically extreme option. Typically 
the government succumbed. But did the government know 
what it was doing? 
Consider corporatisation of state owned enterprises. 
It was evident from the beginning that the new business 
structure was designed to facilitate their privatisation. 
The published Treasury papers showed this preference. A 
preponderance of those sympathetic to privatisation were 
appointed to the new corporations' boards. Treasury offi-
cials even explained to insider audiences that 
corporatisation was a step on the way to privatisation. 
Yet at some time almost every senior minister in the La-
bour Government stated that the government did not 
favour privatisation, and would not privatise state assets. 
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Some even stated that corporatisation would eliminate 
the need for privatisation. 
While we await memoirs from the politicians which 
explain what they thought they were doing, it is possi-
ble to say something about what was happening outside 
parliament. Among the conventions which Muldoon 
acknowledged and Labour attacked was that a democ-
racy involves a widespread debate, in which different 
viewpoints are presented and listened to. Although 
Muldoon appeared to repress dissent, the economic de-
bate was never destroyed. 
For example, about the time I became director of 
the Institute of Economic Research in late 1981, Muldoon 
brutally castigated a couple of economists for advocat-
ing devaluation of the currency. This put me in a 
quandary, because it was- and is - impossible to be a 
serious commentator about the state of a small open 
economy such as New Zealand without referring to the 
exchange rate. So I continued to talk about the exchange 
rate, and while I never advocated the need for an im-
mediate and substantial devaluation, that was the clear 
import of my analysis. Muldoon never publicly ob-
jected to my commentary, and I was comfortable with 
discussing the policy context without advocating a spe-
cific policy change. If I had been a policy advocate, I 
should have become a politician instead. Thus within a 
certain context, Muldoon allowed a considerable eco-
nomic debate. 
Imagine my astonishment at the stronger pressures 
against dissenting economic commentary when Labour 
came to power. I suppose I had been warned. Before 
the election I had written a Listener column which di-
rectly confronted Muldoon's economic management 
style by arguing that intervention should be limited, 
and that in many circumstances it was better to leave 
matters to the market mechanism. However the column 
also acknowledged that there were occasions in which 
interventions were appropriate and effective. At least 
one Treasury official found that latter sentiment unac-
ceptable, and the message was fed back to me that the 
Institute would never get any further Treasury con-
tracts (a threat that, in the event, was effected as long as 
I was the Institute director). 
The Institute was not alone in being treated this 
way. Other consultants who deviated from the tight 
New Right ideological line of the Treasury soon found 
themselves also cut out of government consultancies 
(and they suffered petty harassments too), while the 
more compliant were favoured with contracts and ap-
pointments . Within the Treasury, dissenters were 
repressed, found their careers blocked, and eventually 
left. 
So the new government was more repressive and 
less tolerant of intellectual dissent than the old. What 
seems to have happened is that the ideological extrem-
ists needed the moderates when they were facing 
Muldoon, but once they came to power, they would 
brook no challenge. As Lenin is alleged to have said, 
"the first thing to do after the revolution is to shoot the 
intellectuals". 
This repression of open discussion has not ceased, 
as is evident from the dumbing down of New Zealand, 
observable in the lowering intellectual quality of news-
papers and broadcasting. Universities reduce their 
research activity through the demands of teaching. Some 
departments, especially in commerce faculties, teach 
only the commercialisation approach, repressing alter-
natives. The direction of science research is more under 
the control of the minister . Jane Kelsey's The New Zea-
land Revolution lists the "democratic deficit". Jim Traue 
in this series pointed out the commercialisation of in-
formation is repressive, and anti-intellectual. Tony 
Simpson described the undermining of the independ-
ent public service. The Schick report on the public sector 
reforms remarked there was "more pressure for con-
formity and group think" in the public service. A 
consultant's report during the health reforms said "do 
not shelter non-committed employees": more simply-
dissenters should be sacked. 
New Zealand has never been a society which has 
honoured intellectual effort or dissent, preferring in-
stead to praise the practical. At the turn of the century 
the French observer Andre Siegfried wrote of New Zea-
landers: 
The colonials, moreover, are generally men of mingled 
strength and simplicity. Their strength makes them un-
conscious of obstacles, and they attack the most delicate 
questions much as one opens a path through the forest 
with an axe. Their outlook, not too carefully reasoned, 
and no doubtful scornful of scientific thought, makes 
them incapable of self distrust. Like almost all men of 
action they have a contempt for theories: yet they are 
often captured by the first theory that turns up, if it is 
demonstrated to them with an appearance of logic suf-
ficient to impose upon them. In most cases they do not 
seem to see difficulties, and they propose simple solu-
tions for the most complex problems with astonishing 
audacity. At heart they are probably convinced that 
politics are not as complicated as they have been made 
out to be, and that a little courage and decision are all 
that is required to accomplish reforms of which Europe 
is so afraid.' 
He was not the first to observe this phenomenon. 
Forty years earlier, Samuel Butler wrote 
It will be seen ... that the Erewhonians are a meek and 
long-suffering people, easily led by the nose, and quick 
to offer up common sense ... when a philosopher arises 
among them .. . 
Interestingly this quotation appears on the imprint 
page of Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies, 
a book written in New Zealand which criticised both 
platonists and hegelians, with their grand vision intol-
erant of opposition. 
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These sentiments are echoed in Keynes' famous 
remark that practical men and women are but slaves of 
some defunct theorist. He had the fascist dictators of 
1930s in mind, but he could equally have been talking 
about many New Zealanders. 
In this tradition, the New Zealand commercialisers 
were contemptuous of genuine intellectual activity, and 
yet were readily captured by defunct philosophers and 
economists . My Commercialisation of New Zealand ex-
plains they were platonists, although such practical 
people are quite unaware of their mentor philosophers. 
In economic terms they pursued a methodology ca lled 
the "tight prior", which is not, alas, a jolly rotund fel-
low singing bibulously songs of a tenuous moral 
content, but -an approach in which the facts of a situa-
tion are ignored or altered in order to preserve the 
theory. 
A non-economic example of the methodology is 
Jean-Paul Satre's whose "wonderfully ingenious brain 
could always think up an escape clause to save the 
ideal at the expense of reality. The parallel with accept-
ance of revealed religion is obvious." The notion of 
revealed religion nicely describes the commercialist fun-
damentalists' approach. They are obsessive, 
unreasonable, and intolerant, and so a threat to liberal 
democracy. Those who do not belong to their sect are to 
be treated to the twentieth century equivalent of the 
intolerance of the inquisition or jihad . 
And so New Zealanders complied with the 
commercialisers, by ignoring the attack on dissenters, 
and joining the sect. It was a short term strategy as Otto 
Neimoller reminds us: 
In Germany, the Nazis came for the Communists and I 
didn't speak up because I was not a Communist. Then 
they came for the Jews and I didn't speak up because I 
was not a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists 
and I didn't speak up because I was not a trade union-
ist. Then they came for the Catholics and I was a 
Protestant so I didn't speak up. Then they came for me 
... By that time there was no one to speak up for any-
one. 
I am always interested by those who tell me how at 
first they supported the commercialist reforms, but 
changed their mind at a certain point. The point at 
which, although they do not say this, is almost invari-
ably where their own interests were affected. As the 
Neimoller quote reminds us, at some stage in such re-
forms "you are next" . 
However there is a fundamental weakness in policy 
driven by the tight prior, by religious zealotry, which 
will not brook dissent nor countenance the possibility 
that it is wrong. Consider the blitzkrieg principles- the 
political strategy of the commercialisers - set down by 
Roger Douglas at the New Right Mont Pelerin Society 
meeting in Christchurch in 1990: 
-If a solution makes sense in the medium term, go for it 
without qualification or hesitation. Nothing else deliv-
ers a result which will truly satisfy the public. 
-Consensus among interest groups on quality decisions 
rarely, if ever, arises before they are made and imple-
mented. it develops, after they are taken, as the decisions 
deliver satisfactory results to the public. 
- Do not try to advance a step at a time. Define your 
objectives clearly and move towards them in quantum 
leaps. 
-Vested interests continuously underestimate their own 
ability to adjust successfully in an environment where 
the government is rapidly removing privilege across a 
wide front. 
-It is uncertainty, not speed, that endangers the success 
of structural reform programmes. Speed is an essential 
ingredient in keeping uncertainty down to the lowest 
possible level. 
- Once the programme begins to be implemented, don' t 
stop until you have completed it. The fire of opponents 
is much less accurate if they have to shoot at a rapidly 
moving target. 
- The abolition of privilege is the essence of structural 
reform. 10 
This is not only an anti-democratic recipe for re-
form, but the formulation shows no introspection as to 
how one might decide that a policy solution is right. 
Given uncertainty of purpose is the greatest threat, the 
approach requires that all opposition to the reforms 
must come from "privilege", or vested interests. Resist-
ance can never occur as a result of a valid criticism. 
There is no room for reflection or an alternative analy-
sis. Once the commitment is made, speed and quantum 
leaps are essential; anything less is vulnerable to resist-
ance from the vested interests . Under urgency there 
cannot be consultation, it is after that the public will 
see its benefits . 
This blitzkrieg approach was all the more ironic for 
being expounded at a meeting honouring Karl Popper, 
whose social engineering was essentially incrementalist. 
He would have loathed Douglas' paper, which he would 
have seen as "Plato's dream like the Leninist actuality 
... of an elite political order guided in the exercise of 
absolute political power by its supposed insight into 
essential reality ."" If the message is not quite, 'follow 
the fuhrer, for he knows what is best for you', it is a 
'unquestioningly follow the message, for our ideas are 
best'. 
We can see now the need to destroy dissent, for it 
challenges the certainty required for the success. Moreo-
ver the approach has built in it the explanation for 
dissent. It is not because there is an alternative way. 
Rather dissenters only reflect vested interests. 
Why did the commercialisers insisted theirs was 
the only s trategy. They did not say "TINA- there is no 
alternative", but they did argue there was only one 
alternative - the existing state of affairs, frequently 
called "Muldoonism". Recently I was discussing the 
broadcasting policy reforms with an ex-Treasury offi-
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cial. His response to my criticisms was "you were not 
in favour of the [then existing] BCNZ, were you?". That 
is how such issues were approached - the choice was 
between the status quo and their solution. That is the 
sense in which they allowed no alternative. 
But suppose, just suppose, the chosen policy was 
wrong: wrong not in the sense of there being a better 
policy option as the case of corporatisation, but wrong 
in the sense that the policy was ill conceived, as it was 
in the case of the health reforms. Once the blitzkrieg 
strategy was embarked upon, there was absolutely no 
mechanism to abort it or even to transform the reform 
into a viable option. Moreover, since anyone with the 
slightest expertise is going to point out the reform is 
misconceived, they will be treated as dissenters. Con-
versely policy advisers ignorant of the issues may be 
loyal to the reforms. Given a willingness by these prac-
tical people to jump aboard wherever the action is- or 
wherever the fees are - there will be a mass of unin-
formed cheering the revolution on, as occurred with 
the health reforms. 
It is not today's remit to review the mistaken direc-
tion of the health reforms, although observe that while 
there has been a considerable backing down, there is 
still no admission of the failure. People have died be-
cause of the reformer's incompetence. In a minor way it 
parallels the deaths that occurred under the revolu-
tions in France, Russia, China or the fascist revolution 
in Germany. People were expendable in the interests of 
the pursuit of the essential reality of the true religion. 
The trouble with fundamentalists' predictions is 
that they keep going wrong, despite being made with 
the utmost confidence in the truths on which they are 
based. Reality keeps pressing in, so they have to keep 
reinterpreting their story, but never at the expense of 
the fundamentalist's ideology which cannot be contra-
dicted by facts. Escape clause follows upon escape 
clause, and history is rewritten or forgotten. Most of 
the unbelievers, who say the emperor has no clothes, 
are attacked, typically by misrepresentation and almost 
always without addressing the issues being raised. 
Perhaps the economic reforms have been a bigger 
failure than the health reforms. There has been some 
economic successes, most notably the reduction in the · 
rate of inflation. But the economic growth record has 
been disappointing, the worst in the rich OECD, while 
there is no evidence of significant increases in produc-
tivity. Recall how we were promised such gains, how 
the 1986-1987 share market boom was seen as evidence 
of its success, as was the 1994-1995 cyclical upswing. 
What we have today is an economy in a cyclical down-
swing, with the optimistic prospect of long term 
economic growth rate similar to the rest of the rich 
OECD, but at a much lower level. Most New Zealand-
ers are at a lower material standard of living than they 
were when the reforms began. That was not what the 
reformers promised. 
Yet the z.ealots continue to press for reforms. I 
recall a seminar on agricultural policy just before the 
1984 election. One Treasury official argued that limited 
proposals for changes in a more market direction would 
not give much benefit. Subsequently we joked that it 
was the 'dog licence' problem. As long as there was any 
single intervention left - even dog licences - the agri-
cultural sector could not prosper. That joke became a 
grim reality, as the zealots argue that the reason for so 
little success from their reforms is because we have not 
gone far enough. There are still dog licences. Appar-
ently one gets no significant gains from introducing 
90% of the policies; the gains only occur at full imple-
mentation. The zealots ignore the possibility that their 
extremism destroyed any gains from moderate poli-
cies, and that is why they have so few successes. 
The existence of such zealots should not surprise 
us. In a liberal democracy we should treat them with a 
tolerance they have not shown those who disagreed 
with them. What puzzles me is their political strength. 
Even if we add in the punch-drunk who keep climbing 
back into the ring long after their cause is lost, and the 
'main chancers' who see financial benefit and status 
from their participation in the implementation of fur-
ther reforms, there are still insufficient numbers to 
explain the vigour of the permanent revolutionaries. 
There are two key factors which give them this 
unjustified significance. First, in suppressing dissent, 
the commercialisers destroyed the capacity to create 
any paradigm that could be the basis for alternative 
policies. Such policies exist, but they are not a central 
part of the public debate. Unlike the commercialist blitz-
krieg, the alternatives are likely to be democratic, to 
require an understanding by the public and some agree-
ment of their general thrust. By repressing dissent, the 
commercialisers destroyed any early adoption of an 
alternative. Theirs was a scorched earth policy. We 
adopt their policies - or nothing. 
This lacuna is compounded by the understandable, 
but atavistic, preference of the public to return to the 
old ways. They have suffered, and are suffering from 
the reforms. The past seems attractive. Because they 
think of the reforms as a political revolution and have 
not understood the underlying long term social revolu-
tion, the impossibility of not being able to go back is 
ignored . Of course it is a truism we cannot go back, but 
the commercialisers are anxious to suggest the choice 
is only between their prescriptions and those of the 
distant past. So we are locked into a policy stasis in 
which the commercialisers claim to have the only vi-
able policy, although on the evidence, it is a failed one. 
The second reason why the permanent revolution-
aries remain so important, is because of the nature of 
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the power change in the revolution. From a distance it 
appears that the same dite ruled before and after the 
revolution, but in fact there was a inter-generational 
coup. Roger Kerr, chief executive of the Business 
Roundtable, nicely captured the change with ' [t]he av-
erage age of chief executives of major companies has 
dropped ten years ... A generation of human capital 
has been obliterated.'" The effect of the revolution was 
to replace prematurely one generation of business men 
with a younger cohort, to replace the fathers with their 
sons. 
Patricide is one of the most heinous of crimes, to be 
justified only by some greater purpose. In New Zea-
land the coup could not be justified- as happens in the 
third world- by an external threat, by corruption, or by 
communal tensions. So the new coup leaders used an 
ideological justification for their seizure of power. Con-
veniently the Treasury and the New Right offered such 
a dogma, which involved - as is usual in coups - the 
exaggeration of the sins of the predecessors. Especially 
distorted was the claim of New Zealand's poor eco-
nomic performance before 1984. 
Of course, the business community in New Zea-
land is not especially philosophically competent. Intel-
lectual activity in any of its manifestations was rarely 
pursued in their university training, and few showed 
much facility thereafter. Without genuine intellectual 
roots, the businessman was vulnerable to any political 
fashion, providing it allowed him to get on with busi-
ness. Richard Hofstadter, writing of a society much less 
antagonistic to intellectual life than New Zealand, com-
ments "I put business in the vanguard of anti-intellec-
tualism in our [American] culture". 
Thus the business leaders seized upon the com-
mercialist ideology, flattering to them as it is, without 
much understanding of its significance. It promised 
them power and influence. Which it delivered, ena-
bling them to replace the older generation. It promised 
them riches, which it delivered . Earlier I mentioned 
that the economy had been so stagnant that most peo-
ple were worse off than before the reforms. But the 
massive tax cuts on the rich, lifting their incomes by a 
quarter, had to be paid for by tax hikes and public 
expenditure cuts on middle income people and the poor. 
Thus the elite and the rest of the nation have quite 
different perceptions about the outcomes from com-
mercialisation. The elite may be better off, but who is 
paying for it? 
Paul Samuelson characterised the market as a vot-
ing system, in which each dollar has the weight of one 
vote. Contrast it with the political system in which each 
person has one vote. As the balance of influence over 
our destiny shifts from the political system to the mar-
ket system, as it has done under commercialisation, 
those who hold more dollars increase their influence 
over those with less. The majority of New Zealanders, 
who have less than average incomes, have less control 
over their lives under the commercialisation revolu-
tion, while the business elite have more (and so they 
used their power to increase their share of income - of 
market votes- even further) . 
Note how the reforms thwarted some of the demo-
cratic pressures which had been evolving in the 1970s 
and early 1980s. The greater weight of women's issues 
in political life, has been diminished by the reduced 
significance of the political system. One is not surprised 
there are no women on the Business Roundtable. The 
opening up of government by such changes as the Offi-
cial Information Act has been frustrated by legislative 
changes, and the reduced significance of non-commer-
cial decision making. The commercialisation of infor-
mation inhibits democracy. 
But if the reforms delivered power, influence, and 
riches, to the new elite it did not deliver them economic 
success. From one perspective the elite do not recog-
nize this. Since they have done well out of the reforms, 
they want to assume the rest of the public has too. It is 
much harder to acknowledge that their income gains 
have been at the expense of everyone else. But except in 
the financial sector, the business elite should be aware 
that their businesses are not prospering as was prom-
ised. 
There are two difficulties here. First, as for the rest 
of the population, the alternative is not evident. And 
second, to acknowledge the failure of the ideology 
would be to leave those in power open to the charge of 
patricide: that all their objective was to replace one 
elite with another. All there is to show for it is the new 
elite's power and income. Rather than admit failure to 
attain wider objectives, they cling to the ideology that 
has got them to where they are. Recall Douglas's advice 
"the fire of opponents is much less accurate if they 
have to shoot at a rapidly moving target". The perma-
nent revolution is necessary to protect the gains already 
made, by keeping the target moving. Certainly this revo-
lution is consolidating in power. But it is not 
consolidating its authority. 
The elite has paid a price for this strategy. In their 
hearts, many must find the New Right libertarian phi-
losophy it is based upon profoundly disturbing. And if 
they have gained a freedom from the impositions of the 
New Zealand government, they are now increasingly 
controlled by overseas interests. The Business 
Roundtable is dominated by chief executives whose 
corporations are foreign owned. 
And yet the danger of the permanent revolution is 
that another group of revolutionaries will foster an-
other coup. Revolutionaries always face fundamental 
policy instability. On the one side there are the 
commercialisers in effective power, on the other the 
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vast majority of the public who await the benefits they 
were promised, and demand an alternative strategy, 
albeit one they are only vaguely aware of. 
This was acknowledged in the three ministerial 
briefings on the health reforms. Each plaintively pointed 
out that the public was not committed to the new health 
system structures. The resulting policy instability cre-
ates the likelihood that within the planning horizon 
there would be a major unpredictable policy change. 
The caution applies to most policy areas - not just the 
health system. The zealots, by advocating further revo-
lution, exacerbate the instability. The danger is they 
may pull the whole temple down on top of themselves 
as well. 
Prime minister Bolger, who presided over the peak 
of the commercialisation triumph in 1991, soon realised 
they were unpopular, and has since fostered policy 
moderation, trying to consolidate the reforms, without 
the destabilisation which comes from progressing them. 
But the zealots' demand for further change ensures the 
issues are not settled, the reforms have not succeeded, 
that policy is still open to debate and redirection. The 
blitzkriegers try to force further reforms, but given in-
creasing public resistance, the counterattack may occur. 
Keeping the bike moving forward in this sort of terrain 
may result in the rider falling off too. Perhaps wiser 
heads would recommend dismounting. 
The polls have constantly shown the public has at 
best only reluctantly supported the political revolu-
tion, and in many policy areas bitterly oppose what has 
happened. It may be that the population is now so 
heterogenous, that with the best will, there can be no 
majority agreement on many issues. Nevertheless I think 
a broad framework can be sketched, at least in the 
economic area: 
• Because of the social revolution (together with the pres-
sures from globalisation) there can be no going back to 
the past strategy of centralis! economic regulation; 
• The more decentralised society will be achieved by 
more local autonomy, a liberal social regime, and by 
using the market mechanism more than was done a 
couple of decades ago. 
• But the market mechanism will be overridden by other 
procedures, either because the nation has other social 
objectives, or to moderate the market including restrain-
ing monopolies, ameliorating gross disparities in income 
and wealth and the severe hardship from sharp eco-
nomic transitions, and containing the focus on self 
interest which the market engenders. 
The social objectives will include: 
• a high material standard of living moderated by 
• a quality of life characterised by recognition of the 
contribution of non-material considerations, includ-
ing morality, spirituality, human rights, culture, and 
the pursuits of the intellect (none of which are dealt 
with well by a commercialist approach); 
• tolerance of dissent, and the celebration of differ-
ences within the community; 
• social responsibility for hardship arising from com-
munity or external shocks; 
• an element of control over one's national, local, and 
personal destiny; and 
• environmental and social sustainability. 
In summary we need to rebalance the political and 
market mechanisms for regulating our lives. The mar-
ket mechanism (and its various commercialist relations) 
is a means to a higher end, not the end itself. 
It is easier to state such objectives, than to imple-
ment them, especially if one has no grand plan like the 
commercialisers, but sees sound reform as a process of 
step by step social engineering, involving public par-
ticipation and agreement. This is not like the difficulty 
of unscrambling an egg - or of getting the toothpaste 
back into the tube. In that the political revolution was a 
response to a social revolution, and in that the world 
outside New Zealand is increasingly globalised, we can-
not go back to any golden era, no matter how attractive 
it may seem. 
What I would like to predict is that the next change 
will be more carefully thought through, more coherent, 
than the commercialisation revolution. But the reality 
is that New Zealanders are a meek and long-suffering 
people, easily led by the nose, and quick to offer up 
common sense when a defunct philosopher arises among 
them. 
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